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Discussion of the resultsAbstract
In this paper I evaluate the usefulness of a set of ﬁscal indicators as early-warning-signal tools
for annual General Government Net Lending developments for some EMU countries (Belgium,
Germany, Spain, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Ireland, Austria, Finland) and an EMU aggregate.
The indicators are mainly based on monthly and quarterly public accounts’ ﬁgures. I illustrate
how the dynamics of the indicators show a remarkable performance when anticipating general
government accounts’ movements, both in qualitative and in quantitative terms.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C53; E6; H6.
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June 2005Non-technical summary
Forecasting and monitoring ﬁscal variables’ developments is currently an important policy issue in
Europe. Not only because at the national level adherence of governments to announced budgetary
targets creates a framework of stability, but specially due to supra-national considerations. Firstly,
the forecasting and monitoring of ﬁscal variables appears as crucial to the light of the operation of
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and related national laws, where countries are committed to
submit to the European Commission multi-annual plans presenting forecasts for a certain number
of years. Secondly, the relevance of ﬁscal forecasting and monitoring is evident for the appropriate
implementation of monetary policy in the current EMU decentralised ﬁscal context. Inﬂation and
other key macroeconomic variables’ developments are clearly aﬀected by the ﬁscal stance, so the
availability of appropriate tools to assess deviations from expected outcomes, early in advance, are
needed.
The relevant oﬃcial ﬁgures for the EU policy framework are prepared in annual terms, using
as conceptual reference method the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts (ESA95).
The delay in the availability of these ﬁgures makes diﬃcult the early detection of a deterioration
in the balances that could lead a given country to the danger area approaching the limits set forth
by European ﬁscal rules. The lag in the collection of annual general government account’s ﬁgures
may take half a year before it is deﬁnitive and usable for policy analysis. These unfavourable facts
regarding intra-annual ESA95 ﬁscal information renders the monthly/ quarterly-based revenue and
expenditure cash data on central government and other sub-sectors of the general government
as one of the most important pieces of direct information on ﬁscal variables when assessing the
development of public ﬁnances in the short run. Public accounts’ ﬁgures are published regularly
and timely, with a wide coverage of revenue and expenditure categories.
The speciﬁc features of public sector budgeting and the recording of information on issues
such as tax collection, or social payments, make necessary that the relevant recording period be
the year. For example, in the case of tax and social contributions’ collection, cash amounts are
recorded in public sector accounts but they should be time-adjusted so that they are attributed
to the period when the activity took place to generate the liability. This makes a monthly proﬁle
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June 2005based on cash accounts not relevant for the monitoring of public sector development within the
year. Nevertheless, new incoming monthly and quarterly ﬁscal ﬁgures can be used by the analyst
to infer likely changes in the ﬁnal annual outcome of the relevant government sector/subsector.
There is scope for infra-annual adjustments (for example, debt redemption payments are usually
announced by governments at the beginning of the year), and a yearly inertia attached to certain
months of the year (for example, the collection of income taxes eﬀected in a given quarter of the
year on a repeated basis) that can be exploited by the analyst.
The use of monthly and quarterly State’s revenues is quite developed in the literature for the
US, and to a lesser extent the UK. On the contrary, public accounts’ ﬁgures in the EMU have been
the subject of little attention in the academic literature, with very few exceptions, and are scarcely
mentioned in any oﬃcial report from pan-European organizations. In this paper I focus on some Net
borrowing/lending series for nine selected euro area countries: Belgium, Germany, Spain, France,
Italy, The Netherlands, Ireland, Austria, and Finland, that amount to almost 95% of euro area
GDP. The methodology was purposely kept simple (regression analysis, basic time series methods).
It consists of two steps: (i) in a ﬁrst step univariate forecasts of monthly/quarterly indicators are
obtained, and the annual counterpart is computed; (ii) in a second step, a regression at the annual
level is run between the target variable (General Government deﬁcit) and the indicator series, so
that a quarterly estimate of the annual General Government deﬁcit can be obtained upon the basis
of the forecast values of the indicators in step (i).
The forecasting performance of the indicators is checked both in quantitative (size of forecast
errors) and qualitative (likely evolution of target variables) terms. In addition, the forecasting
ability of the indicator-based approach is presented against the track record of EU Commission’s
general government deﬁcit forecasts over the last ten years, and an alternative combining both.
Finally, I construct a simple, synthetic indicator for the euro area as a whole. The results turn out
to be quite encouraging in all analysed dimensions.
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June 20051 Introduction
Forecasting and monitoring ﬁscal variables’ developments is currently an important policy issue in
Europe. Not only because at the national level adherence of governments to announced budgetary
targets creates a framework of stability, but also because of two additional reasons, related to
supra-national considerations.
Firstly, the forecasting and monitoring of ﬁscal variables appears as crucial to the light of the
operation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and related national laws, where countries are
committed to submit to the European Commission multi-annual plans presenting forecasts for a
certain number of years. Even in a policy framework where the prevalent reading of the SGP is a lax
interpretation of the “close-to-balance or in surplus” clause (remind the current policy debate about
SGP ﬂexibilisation), the peer pressure at the EU level is positioned in making governments commit
to the announced plans. Thus both the quality of forecasts published by national governments,
and the monitoring tools employed by supra-national organisations, and private corporations, when
assessing those projections, should be as accurate as possible.
Secondly, the relevance of ﬁscal forecasting and monitoring is evident for the appropriate im-
plementation of monetary policy in the current EMU decentralised ﬁscal context. Inﬂation and
other key macroeconomic variables’ developments are clearly aﬀected by the ﬁscal stance, so the
availability of appropriate tools to assess deviations from expected outcomes, early in advance, are
needed.
Within this general framework, any means of improving ﬁscal forecasting at the EMU level
is warranted. The relevant oﬃcial ﬁgures for the EU policy framework are prepared in annual
terms, using as conceptual reference method the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts
(ESA95). The delay in the availability of these ﬁgures makes diﬃcult the early detection of a
deterioration in the balances that could lead a given country to the danger area approaching the
limits set forth by European ﬁscal rules. The lag in the collection of annual general government
account’s ﬁgures may take half a year before it is deﬁnitive and usable for policy analysis. In order
to ﬁll in this informational gap there is a running Eurostat project aiming at building up quarterly
ﬁscal ﬁgures in ESA95 terms (European Commission, 2002a). Nevertheless, the project presents
some shortcomings in terms of timing (it will only be completed by the end of 2005 in its ﬁrst,
preliminary version), but, specially, coverage (it will be limited to the sample starting in the ﬁrst
quarter of 1999) and timeliness (at least with one quarter of delay).
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quarterly-based revenue and expenditure cash data on central government and other sub-sectors of
the general government as one of the most important pieces of direct information on ﬁscal variables
when assessing the development of public ﬁnances in the short run. Public accounts’ ﬁgures are
published regularly and timely, with a wide coverage of revenue and expenditure categories. They
can be used also as a companion to the quarterly ESA95-based Eurostat series once they are
available.
The speciﬁc features of public sector budgeting and the recording of information on issues such
as tax collection, or social payments, make necessary that the relevant recording period be the year.
For example, in the case of tax and social contributions’ collection, cash amounts are recorded in
public sector accounts but they should be time-adjusted so that they are attributed to the period
when the activity took place to generate the liability. This makes a monthly proﬁle based on cash
accounts not relevant for the monitoring of public sector development within the year.
Nevertheless, new incoming monthly and quarterly ﬁscal ﬁgures can be used by the analyst
to infer likely changes in the ﬁnal annual outcome of the relevant government sector/subsector.
There is scope for infra-annual adjustments (for example, debt redemption payments are usually
announced by governments at the beginning of the year), and a yearly inertia attached to certain
months of the year (for example, the collection of income taxes eﬀected in a given quarter of the year
on a repeated basis) that can be exploited by the analyst. The use of those ﬁgures for monitoring
purposes has to be done with sound statistical tools, and the necessary institutional knowledge of
the data. In this paper I pose more emphasis on the statistical treatment, although in a following
Section I review the institutional peculiarities of the database.
The use of monthly and quarterly State’s revenues is quite developed in the literature for the
US, and to a lesser extent the UK. The empirical works for the US case tend to focus on forecasting
State tax revenue given the need to achieve an end-of-year balanced budget at the State level.
Just to signal a few examples, see Fullerton (1989) or Lawrence et al. (1998), and the references
quoted therein. On the contrary, public accounts’ ﬁgures in the EMU have been the subject
of little attention in the academic literature, and are scarcely mentioned in any oﬃcial report
from pan-European organizations. Some exceptions are Kinnunen (1999) and Moulin et al (2004).
Using Finnish data Kinnunen (1999) concluded that the estimated time series models produced
quite plausible forecasts for the short-term developments of some central government revenue and
expenditure items in national accounts terms. Nevertheless, she also concluded that the volatile
8
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Moulin et al. (2004), analysing the case of France, used monthly cash ﬁgures for the Central
Government to monitor the annual outcome, in the US literature tradition. Camba-Mendez and
Lamo (2004), on diﬀerent grounds, provide estimates for quarterly balances for Germany and Italy,
on the basis of annual general government deﬁcits and quarterly GDP, focusing on the study of
structural deﬁcits.
This paper attempts at ﬁlling in the existing gap in the literature for the EMU. The purpose
is to see whether there is some valuable information in some selected countries’ infra-annual ﬁscal
information that could be used to improve the forecasting and monitoring of annual general gov-
ernment deﬁcit in ESA95 terms, the relevant policy variable at EMU level. To do so I focus on
some Net borrowing/lending series for nine selected euro area countries: Belgium, Germany, Spain,
France, Italy, The Netherlands, Ireland, Austria, and Finland, that amount to almost 95% of euro
area GDP. The available series are referred mainly to the central government sector, with some
exceptions. I restrict the analysis to the balance between revenues and expenditures to make clear
the point of the paper.
The methodology was purposely kept simple (regression analysis, basic time series methods) to
stress the information content of the database, and to potentially attract the attention of policy-
makers. In this sense, the adopted methodology consists of two steps: (i) in a ﬁrst step univariate
forecasts of monthly/quarterly indicators are obtained, and the annual counterpart is computed;
(ii) in a second step, a regression at the annual level is run between the target variable (General
Government deﬁcit) and the indicator series, so that a quarterly estimate of the annual General
Government deﬁcit can be obtained upon the basis of the forecast values of the indicators in step
(i).
The forecasting performance of the indicators is checked both in quantitative (size of forecast
errors) and qualitative (likely evolution of target variables) terms. In addition, the forecasting
ability of the indicator-based approach is presented against the track record of EU Commission’s
general government deﬁcit forecasts over the last ten years, and an alternative combining both
indicator-based estimates and EU Commission provided estimates. Finally, I construct a simple,
synthetic indicator for the euro area as a whole, that turns out to be a quite accurate predictor of
the evolution of the euro area ﬁscal stance in the short run.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets forth the data employed in the analysis, and
presents some illustrative qualitative evidence. The qualitative results are substantiated in Section
9
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is checked in Section 4. In Section 5 I present and analyse the aggregate EMU indicator. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.
2 Data description
2.1 Public Accounts and National Accounts
The preparation and monitoring of annual budget in each EMU country tends to be based on a
speciﬁc deﬁnition (or even several diﬀerent deﬁnitions) of budget deﬁcit, calculated according to
national practices. The accounting procedures, methods of compilation of data, timing of recording
of transactions, as well as the coverage of budgets diﬀer from country to country. It is common
to refer to these ﬁgures as the Public Accounts. In the context of the International Monetary
Fund SDDS project, there has been an attempt to unify these methods, and making national
practices transparent. In contrast, as already mentioned above, the budgetary surveillance at the
European Union level is based on a harmonised concept of deﬁcit. In the context of the excessive
deﬁcit procedure, budget deﬁcit means Net Borrowing/Net Lending of the General Government as
deﬁned by ESA95.
The detailed accounting rules and conventions involved in the compilation of the Net Borrow-
ing/Net Lending of the General Government, and the diﬀerences between National Accounts and
Public Accounts, are important, as will become clear in the next paragraphs1.
The ﬁrst important diﬀerence regards the coverage of each system. On the one hand, in National
Accounts, the relevant sector is the General Government sector which covers Central Government,
State governments, Local governments and Social Security funds. On the other hand, Public Ac-
counts typically covers only the State or the Central Government, which weight on General Gov-
ernment depends on the institutional characteristics of each country. Moreover, even the concepts
of State or Central Government are not the same in Public Accounts and in National Accounts
because, while sectors are deﬁned on a functional basis in the latter, the Public Accounts coverage
is on an institutional basis. As an implication of this principle, the coverage of Public Accounts
may change over time, because of legal and institutional changes, while the coverage of National
Accounts tends to be more stable.
1For a deeper analysis the interested reader can consult European Commission(1996, 2002b) for National Accounts-
related matters, and http://dsbb.imf.org for public accounts speciﬁc features.
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Belgium Indicator: Treasury Budget Receipts minus Treasury Budget Expenditures. Public Accounts.
Monthly (January 1970 - December 2003). Source: National Bank of Belgium.
Germany Indicator: Public Sector Balance. Public Accounts. Quarterly (Q1 1979 - Q4 2003).
Sources Bundesbank Monthly Report, Statistical Appendix, Chapter VIII, Table 1.
Spain Indicator: Central Government Budgetary Balance. Monthly (Public Accounts: January 1984 - December 1998,
ESA95 January 1999 - December 2003). Sources: IGAE and National Institute of Statistics.
France Indicator: Central Government Budgetary Balance. Public Accounts. Monthly.
Sources: Ministry of Economics and Finance. Sample: January 1970 - December 2003.
Italy Indicator: Central Government Borrowing Requirement. Public Accounts. Monthly.
Sources: Bank of Italy. Sample: January 1970 - December 2003.
The Indicator: Central Government Budgetary Balance. Public Accounts. Monthly.
Netherlands Sources: Ministry of Finance. Sample: January 1970 - December 2003 (EMU Balance 1999-2003).
Ireland Indicator: Central Government Exchequer Returns. Public Accounts. Monthly.
Sources: IFS/IMF Q1 1970 - Q4 1995; Ministry of Finance January 1996 - December 2003.
Austria Indicator: Federal Budget. Public Accounts. Monthly.
Sources: IFS/IMF Q1 1970 - Q4 1995; Ministry of Finance January 1996 - December 2003.
Finland Indicator: Central Government Budgetary Balance. Public Accounts. Monthly.
Sources: Bank of Finland. Sample: January 1982 - December 2003.
The second relevant discrepancy regards the calculation of the deﬁcit. The Net Borrow-
ing/Lending in ESA95 is the diﬀerence between revenue and expenditure, which includes current
and capital transactions and exclude all ﬁnancial transactions. Public accounts frequently include
ﬁnancial transactions, such as capital injections or privatisation receipts. Moreover, while transac-
tions are recorded in National Accounts on an accruals basis, Public Accounts are often compiled
at the time of the cash ﬂows.
The third relevant diﬀerence regards frequency and timeliness in the availability of new ﬁgures.
Public Accounts’ ﬁgures present a major advantage in terms of frequency and timeliness, as they
are typically published monthly with short lags, and they are not usually subject to revisions. On
the contrary, National Accounts ﬁgures are only available with a considerable delay, and are subject
to frequent and substantial revisions.
2.2 Database description
In this paper, I focus on a set of mainly Public Accounts-based monthly/quarterly central and
general government balance series for Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, The Netherlands,
11
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time series. Deﬁnitions and sources are displayed in Table 1. For details on the deﬁnitions and
precise coverage the interested reader can consult directly the national sources, as stated in Table
1. I will refer to the selected series as indicators2.
I selected one indicator of Net Lending/Net Borrowing for each of the nine countries with
monthly/quarterly periodicity3. All series were converted into the quarterly frequency in order
to guarantee homogeneity, given that some series (fully or partially) where only available at that
frequency (see Table 1). Figure 1 shows the plot of the selected indicators.
Finally, the source of all annual National Accounts data for General Government is the EU
Commission database AMECO, and covers the period 1970-2003, but for Spain, Austria, and
Finland where the starting date is 1980. The following convention is adopted for homogeneity:
ESA79 ﬁgures are taken for the period 1970 to 1990, while ESA95 ﬁgures are taken for the years
1991 to 2003, but for Spain, where ESA95 ﬁgures where only available from 1996 on4.
2Some corrections had to be done regarding sizable outliers and missing values in the series. For France the
values for January-February of 1970, and 1976 to 1993 were missing, and thus were interpolated using a monthly
Unobserved Components model. In the case of The Netherlands, 1986 and 1987 presented huge values totally out
of line with the historical series, and the decision was to smooth out the corresponding quarters by taking 4-order
centered moving averages; in the ﬁrst and second quarters of 1994 two huge outliers in revenue were marked as missing
and interpolated. For Austria the missing values in the fourth quarter of 1985 and 1989 were interpolated as well .
In the case of Ireland a huge negative outlier in July 1999 was followed by a huge outlier in December 1999 of the
opposite sign: the solution taken was that both values where treated as missing and interpolated. The time series
were interpolated in a standard fashion by estimating Unobserved Components Models.
3I also analysed other indicators for the main six EMU countries. For Belgium the Treasury Financing Requirement
(monthly, for the whole considered period). For Germany the Central Government balance in Public Accounts terms.
For France the Solde g´ en´ eral d’ex´ ecution. For Italy the General Government Borrowing Requirement. In all the cases
the results where almost identical to the ones presented in the paper with the selected indicators.
4The impact of UMTS one-oﬀ proceeds relative to the allocation of mobile licenses (UMTS) was removed from the
Net Lending / Net Borrowing series. The exact amounts were for Germany in 2000 50.8 billions euro, for Spain 0.52
bill. euro in 2000, for Italy 13.8 bill euro in 2000, for The Netherlands 2.7 bn euro in 2000, for Austria 0.81 bn euro
in 2000, for Belgium 0.45 bn euro in 2001, for France 1.2 bn euro in 2001 and 0.62 bn euro in 2002, and for Ireland
0.21 bn euro in 2002. As for the indicator series, corrections were needed in several cases to avoid distortions in the
statistical analysis. For Germany the amount of 50.8 bn euro (2.5% of GDP) was subtracted in the third quarter of
2000, given it was apparently assigned to that quarter; the alternative of removing the huge outlier from the quarterly
series, marking it as a missing observation and ﬁnding an interpolated value produced the same results. For Italy the
amount of 13.8 bn euro (1.2% of GDP) was distributed uniformly in the four quarters of 2000, to guarantee that the
annual counterpart reﬂected the negative amount. The same solution was adopted with the UMTS proceeds in The
Netherlands (amounting to a 0.7% of GDP). For the rest of countries no corrective action was taken, given that no
12
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June 2005Figure 1: Evolution of the selected Indicators. Billions of euro. Quarterly ﬁgures. Sample: see
Table 1.
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June 20052.3 Some preliminary evidence
With a set of simple statistical evidence, it is possible to notice the perceptible comovement be-
tween the selected indicator series and the variable of reference, the General Government Net
Borrowing/Net Lending of each country in ESA terms.
On the one hand, Figure 2 presents the evolution of the General Government deﬁcit series and
the Indicators, for the set of countries under study. The message one can draw from the ﬁgure is that
of an apparent comovement between the Indicators and the General Government variables. One
can take this evidence as a rough indication for the potential long-run link between the Indicator
series and the ESA balances. Notice that this evidence is based on the level of the variables as a
percentage of GDP. It seems to hold irrespective of the ﬁscal decentralization process that has been
a characteristic of the period for most EMU countries.
On the other hand, Table 2 presents the percentage of times that the changes in the General
Government deﬁcit series in ESA terms presented the same sign that the changes in the selected
Indicator series based (mainly) on Public Accounts ﬁgures. Table 2 shows that changes in the
Indicators are quite similar to changes in ESA General Government variables. This fact suggests
that added to the long-run relationship, there might be a short-run relation between the series,
reﬂected in common short-run dynamics. Even if there were diﬀerences in the evolution of the
levels (around a long-run relationship) that might persist for some years (as it is apparent from
Figure 2 - see for example the case of Belgium in the ﬁrst half of the nineties), the important issue
when dealing with short-term forecasting is whether the direction of change of the indicator and
the variable to be indicated is the same.
Notice that the point is not to stress that the indicator anticipates the variable to be indicated,
but rather that there seems to be some kind of contemporaneous comovement. Nevertheless,
given the Indicator variables are observed with anticipation (as monthly/quarterly realisations are
available within the year), the common patterns might be useful when forecasting annual General
Government series.
The insights in Figure 2 and Table 2 can be substantiated in a quantitative fashion by esti-
mating quantitative models for each country, using as exogenous variable the indicator, and as
endogenous variable the General Government deﬁcit (for a general methodological perspective on
leading indicators see Lahiri and Moore (1993)).
amount was bigger that 0.4% of GDP, and that it was not clear where to assign the intervention from the time series
analysis point of view.
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June 2005Figure 2: Evolution of the General Government Net Borrowing (-)/Net Lending (+) in ESA79-
ESA95 (solid-dot line) and Public Accounts Deﬁcit(-)/Surplus(+) Indicator (solid line). Variables
as a percentage of GDP. Annual ﬁgures.
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Table 2: Percentage of common actual changes between General Government deﬁcit series in
ESA79-ESA95 and Indicator series. Changes in annual ﬁgures as a percentage of GDP.
Belgium Germany Spain France Italy The Neth. Ireland Austria Finland
70% 100% 79% 70% 76% 85% 73% 74% 95%
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I estimate in this Section Error Correction Models (see Engle and Granger (1987)), designed to
capture both short- and long-run relationships. In a preliminary stage, following the usual method-
ology, tests on the order of integration of the series were performed, showing that the null hypothesis
of a unit root in the series could not be rejected in all cases5. Taking account of the potential pres-
ence of cointegration, the general speciﬁcation for the estimated Error Correction Models is given


















t + ut (1)
where ∆ stands for the ﬁrst diﬀerence operator (∆Xt = Xt ¡ Xt¡1), and GG for the General
Government deﬁcit. »i
t refers to a vector of dummy variables. In order to account for the method-
ological changeover from ESA79 standards to ESA95 ones, a dummy was included at the time of
the change when it turned out to be statistically signiﬁcant. For Germany a step variable in 1990
was needed to account for the impact of uniﬁcation. Additional dummy variables are mentioned in
Table 3, where all estimation results are displayed.
The following results can be highlighted from Table 3. Firstly, it is worth noticing that the long-
run part is signiﬁcant in all cases. Given the Engle and Granger (1987) representation theorem,
if the coeﬃcients attached to the long-run term turn out to be signiﬁcant (and around one for
all countries), then there is evidence for cointegration. Secondly, the short-run coeﬃcient turns
out to be signiﬁcant as well in all cases: the dynamics of the General Government deﬁcit and the
Indicators are related, in most cases with a coeﬃcient close to unity, being Italy an exception to
this with a coeﬃcient of 0.36. Thirdly, the goodness of ﬁt measures are reasonable in terms of
the percentage of variance explained by the regression models (the R2 ranges from a minimum of
60% in France, to the 90% of Germany), as well as the diagnosis measures that show no remaining
autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity in the residuals.
The validity check for the proposed quarterly variables to be useful (leading) indicators of the
behaviour of the General Government Net Lending/ Borrowing lies in their ability to be useful in the
process of anticipating in advance its future developments. Predictability tests can be performed
5Results are available from the author upon request. Nevertheless, given the small sample available (annual data
from 1970 to 2003), and the potential presence of structural breaks (policy changes) the results from the standard
ADF have to be taken with caution. Given that the ﬁnal aim of the estimated regressions is forecasting, the point of
whether a ﬁrst-diﬀerence or a level speciﬁcation is used is not particularly relevant for this paper.
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obtained from a sequence of recursive or rolling regressions. Following the advice of Kilian and
Inoue (2004) I include two in-sample tests of predictability in Table 3. I include a standard F
test for the null hypothesis of ®1 = 0 and ®2 = 0, i.e. a test for the inﬂuence of the indicator
on the target variable. In addition, I include the Pessaran-Timmerman (1992)6 statistic for the
null hypothesis of independence between ∆ GGt
GDPt and ∆ ˆ GGt
GDPt, where ∆ ˆ GGt












t. Both tests conﬁrm the result already signalled that the
indicators do have a strong information content in predicting the general government deﬁcit as a
percentage of GDP. In the case of the Pesaran and Timmerman test the null of independence is
rejected clearly in all cases, while in the F-test case the joint null of ®1 = 0 and ®2 = 0 is also
clearly rejected.
Nevertheless, given the constraints a real-time forecaster would be facing when making use of
the described models, in the next Section I add an out-sample forecasting exercise. To do so, I
follow a two-steps approach:
² Given new incoming quarterly information for a certain indicator it is possible to update its
value for the current year by means of (univariate) forecasts of the remaining quarters to
complete the ﬁnal annual outcome. When the fourth quarter is available, the annual ﬁgure
for the indicator is available, and there is no need for forecasts.
² Given this updated annual value of the indicator in each quarter, it is possible to obtain an
annual estimate of the General Government deﬁcit by means of estimated regressions of the
kind displayed in equation (1), upon the basis of data available up to that quarter.
6Let ˆ Xt ´ ˆ GGt
GDPt be a predictor of Xt ´
GGt
GDPt. Deﬁne yt ´ Xt ¡ Xt¡1 and y
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p
t > 0, I
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t = 0 if y
p





t = 1 if yt y
p
t > 0, I
y;yp
t = 0 if yt y
p
t · 0). The proportion of times that the sign of yt is correctly predicted is












t , then an estimator of P¤ = Prob(I
y;yp
t = 1) is
ˆ P¤ = ˆ Py ˆ Pyp + (1 ¡ ˆ Py) (1 ¡ ˆ Pyp). The Pesaran and Timmerman (1992) non-parametric test for the null hypothesis
that yt and y
p
t are independently distributed is computed as:
PT =
ˆ P ¡ ˆ P¤
fV ( ˆ P) ¡ V ( ˆ P¤)g1=2 » N(0;1)
where V ( ˆ P) = T
¡1 ˆ P¤(1¡ ˆ P¤) and V ( ˆ P¤) = T
¡1((2 ˆ Py¡1)
2 ˆ Pyp(1¡ ˆ Pyp)) + T
¡1((2 ˆ Pyp¡1)
2 ˆ Py(1¡ ˆ Py)) + 4T
¡2( ˆ Py ˆ Pyp
(1 ¡ ˆ Py)(1 ¡ ˆ Pyp)).
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t + ut. Annual ﬁgures.










Belgium 0.926 0.367 -0.908 Impulse 1990 PT test (pval) = 0.01990
1970-2003 (0.133) (0.227) (0.059) Impulse 1981y F test (pval) = 0.00003
R2=0.79; ¾2
u=0.78; LM(1)(pval)=1.000; White Test(pval)=0.261
Germany 0.959 0.333 -1.277 Step 1990 PT test (pval) = 0.00001
1979-2003 (0.080) (0.169) (0.117) F test (pval) = 0.00000
R2=0.90; ¾2
u=0.10; LM(1)(pval)=0.292; White Test(pval)=0.174
Spain 1.262 0.668 -0.786 PT test (pval) = 0.0004
1984-2003 (0.088) (0.216) (0.050) F test (pval) = 0.00000
R2=0.86; ¾2
u=0.33; LM(1)(pval)=0.170; White Test(pval)=0.492
France 0.799 0.603 -1.010 Step 1990 PT test (pval) = 0.00010
1970-2003 (0.106) (0.173) (0.089) Step 1995 F test (pval) = 0.00000
R2=0.62; ¾2
u=0.47; LM(1)(pval)=0.279; White Test(pval)=0.149
Italy 0.357 0.252 -1.022 Impulse 1975 PT test (pval) = 0.00050
1970-2003 (0.068) (0.073) (0.076) 1983y, Step 1993 F test (pval) = 0.00001
R2=0.77; ¾2
u=0.71; LM(1)(pval)=0.513; White Test(pval)=0.299.
The 0.955 0.203 -0.931 Impulse 1983 PT test (pval) = 0.00000
Netherlands (0.087) (0.082) (0.132) F test (pval) = 0.00000
1970-2003 R2=0.82; ¾2
u=0.37; LM(1)(pval)=0.390; White Test(pval)=0.396.
Ireland 0.695 0.185 -1.179 Impulse 1975 PT test (pval) = 0.00043
1970-2003 (0.088) (0.086) (0.142) Impulse 1996 F test (pval) = 0.00000
R2=0.79; ¾2
u=0.76; LM(1)(pval)=0.537; White Test(pval)=0.689
Austria 0.943 0.469 -1.134 PT test (pval) = 0.00008
1980-2003 (0.094) (0.142) (0.085) F test (pval) = 0.00000
R2=0.79; ¾2
u=0.30; LM(1)(pval)=1.000; White Test(pval)=0.235
Finland 0.866 0.624 -1.067 Constant PT test (pval) = 0.00005
1982-2003 (0.135) (0.285) (0.123) F test (pval) = 0.00000
R2=0.77; ¾2
u=1.91; LM(1)(pval)=0.800; White Test(pval)=0.111
Notes:
(i) Figures in parenthesis below estimates are standard errors of the estimates (White heteroskedasticity consistent
variances estimates).
(ii) Diagnosis measures: (1) R2: coeﬃcient of determination; (2) ¾2
u: estimated variance of regression residuals.
(3) LM(k): Lagrange Multiplier test for serial correlation in the residuals (null hypothesis of no serial correlation up
to lag order k. (4) White Test (White, 1980): test for heteroskedasticity in the residuals (null hypothesis of no
heteroskedasticity against heteroskedasticity of some unknown general form); (5) PT-test: Pesaran and Timmerman
test of predictive performance, for the null hypothesis of independence between ∆(GGt=GDPt) and
the estimate for ∆(GGt=GDPt) based on the regression; (6) F-test: standard test for the null hypothesis ®1 = ®2 = 0.
(iii) Dummy variables: (1) Impulse: a variable with a 1 at date t, and zero elsewhere; (2) Step: 1 from date t till the
end of the sample, and zero elsewhere. (3) Impulse 1981y: variable with four non-zero elements: a 1 in 1981 and 1983,
a -1 in 1982 and 1984; (4) Impulse 1983y: variable with three non-zero elements: a 1 in 1983 and 1985, a -1 in 1984.
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4.1 Alternative methods
In order to check the accuracy of the estimates I compare the annual estimates based on the
regressions in (1), updated four times a year, with the actual outcome of the annual General
Government deﬁcit. Instead of just analysing the shape and behaviour of the so-generated forecast
errors’ time series, I analyse them in conjunction with some alternatives of obtaining estimates of
the objective variable based on diﬀerent techniques and information sets.
I consider the following alternative ways: (i) estimates based on the regression in (1); (ii)
estimates taken from European Commission bi-annual forecast reports; (iii) a combination of (i)
and (ii) ; (iv) estimates based on the previous available annual ﬁgure (random walk forecast)7.
As shown in Artis and Marcelino (2001) or Kereman (1999), the forecast record of the European
Commission is among the best of the international organizations producing regular forecasts for Eu-
ropean countries (others include the International Monetary Fund and the OECD). The European
Commission forecasts make use of all available information at the time the forecasts is done, and are
based on a bottom-up approach, not forecasting directly the deﬁcit/surplus but rather computing
it as the diﬀerence between revenues and expenditures. In addition, ﬁscal forecasts are produced in
a framework in which macroeconomic models and experts’ judgement are an important ingredient.
In this sense, European Commission forecasts can be deemed as full information forecasts in terms
of employed data and projection methods. When comparing the Indicator-based forecasts with the
Commission ones, I do not have in mind an accuracy comparison, but I rather try to ascertain how
close the Indicator-based forecasts are to full information based projections8. This is the reason
7I also computed estimates of the General Government deﬁcit based on estimates of its components: Central
Government (obtained from a regression of the kind of (1), Local Government and Social Security (obtained from
annual random walks). The results of this disaggregated approach were worse that those obtained with the aggregated
one, thus signalling that this disaggregated approach was not particularly useful.
8Notice that I am just picking up the estimates for the deﬁcit ratio to GDP published by the EU Commission. In
the predictive ability exercise I do not internalise the employed methods (mixture of econometric and judgemental),
neither I do have information on the available information set at the time the forecast was done on macroeconomic
variables, policy measures announced and internalised, ﬁscal variables (that do depend on macro variables), maybe
even information on the ﬁscal indicators presented here. Given that I cannot control for all these factors, thus
preventing me from making a real-time comparison, trying to read my results as a direct comparison would not be
fair. In this sense I refer to the EU Commission projections as control forecasts for the performance of the proposed
intra-annual ﬁscal indicators, not being interested in its own performance, but rather being interested in observing
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and 1/3 to the indicator-based alternative. Symmetric weights (1/2-1/2) produced similar results,
but I wanted to stress with the non-symmetry the potential use of indicator-based forecasts as
companions to model-based, full-information alternatives.
The alternatives diﬀer in the forecast method employed, and the amount of information used,
but also in the periodicity forecasts are produced. On the one hand, the availability of quarterly
data for the indicators permit having four estimates of the General Government deﬁcit for a given
year (one attached to the regression run with each quarterly update), with diﬀerent information
sets. On the other hand, the European Commission publishes forecasts in Spring (normally around
May) and Autumn (normally around November) of each year, both for the year in course (current
year), and a year ahead. Finally, the random walk alternative do not have intra-annual updates,
as it is based directly on annual data.
4.2 Design of the forecasting exercise
The paper is focused on how updating quarterly information helps in anticipating the likely evo-
lution of annual deﬁcit outcomes. With this aim in mind, I do evaluate the performance of the
proposed indicator-based methods (and the alternatives described above) according to their abil-
ity to forecast annual outcomes for the current year and a year ahead, given quarterly updates
of the information. This exercise is in line with the typical forecasting exercise in international
organisations (for example, the EU Commission, the International Monetary Fund, or the OECD)
and budgeting practices in many European countries (where a revision on oﬃcial deﬁcit targets is
published by mid-year). The usual forecasting comparison for a panel of quarterly horizons would
not be that interesting for practical policy purposes, and would hide the potential relevance of
intra-annual updates for the annual forecast. Thus, I designed the following forecasting exercise for
the period 1994-20039 for all selected alternatives:
² Construct current year forecasts: using information up to quarter j of a given year t construct
an estimate of the annual general government deﬁcit of year t. To this end estimates/actuals
for the rest of quarters of year t are needed. Thus, for each year t four estimates are produced,
the comparative behaviour of my forecasts.
9The sample window 1994-2003 was selected to guarantee at least ten years for the estimation of the shorter
sample regression, that was the one for Spain where the sample starts in the ﬁrst quarter of 1984. Notice that for
Austria is 1980, for Germany 1979 and for Finland 1982.
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Year t 
Q1     Q2     Q3    Q4 
quarters 
Year t+1  Year t-1 
Current year (year t) forecast with information up to 
Q1 year t (an estimate for Q2, Q3 and Q4 year t is 
needed) 
Year ahead (Year t+1) forecast with information up 
to Q1 year t (an estimate for Q2, Q3, Q4 year t, and 
for Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4 year t+1 is needed) 
with diﬀerent forecast origins, but the same ﬁnal horizon.
² Construct year ahead forecasts: using information up to quarter j of a given year t construct an
estimate of the annual general government deﬁcit of year t+1. To this end estimates/actuals
for the rest of quarters of year t and year t+1 are needed. Thus, for each year t+1 four
estimates (at the most) are produced, with diﬀerent forecast origins, but the same ﬁnal
horizon.
Taking the ﬁrst quarter of a given year t as an example, Figure 3 displays graphically this ex-
ercise. It is worth noticing that indicator-based regressions are re-estimated when a new quarterly
ﬁgure is available, and so are the implied annual estimates. Several clariﬁcations are needed regard-
ing implications of this design, in particular for the information set available to each alternative
when generating current year and year ahead forecasts.
Firstly, as regards the timing of EU Commission forecasts. Given that the EU Commission only
publishes bi-annual reports (Spring and Autumn), I adopted the following convention to assign a
forecast to each of the four quarters in a given year: (i) for the ﬁrst quarter of year t, I take t ¡ 1
Autumn forecasts; (ii) for the second quarter of year t, I take year t Spring forecasts; (iii) for the
third quarter of year t, I take again Spring forecasts done at t; (iv) ﬁnally, for the fourth quarter
21
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 497
June 2005of year t, year t Autumn forecasts. This quarterly allocation is consistent with the information
available to a real-time forecaster wanting to use available EU Commission forecasts in a particular
quarter10.
Secondly, regarding the annual random walk alternative forecasts for current year t and year
ahead forecast t + 1 use information up to year t ¡ 1 (i.e. no intra annual update is done).
Notice that at each quarter j of year t it is possible to build up an estimate for the General
Government deﬁcit for year t+q, based on an information set including all available information up
that point, i.e. ft;jg for alternatives with intra-annual update (full use of available information),
and ft¡1;0g for alternatives with no intra-annual update (not using quarterly updates, so I adopt
the convention j = 0). Notice also that q is equal to 0 for current year forecasts, and equal to
1 for the year ahead ones, so that it cannot be interpreted as a forecast horizon: if there is no
intra-annual update, what is called current year forecasts are predictions at horizon 1 (in terms
of years), while year ahead forecasts are predictions at horizon 2 (again, in terms of years). For
alternatives with quarterly updates, current year forecasts can again be deemed as predictions at
horizon 1 and year ahead forecasts at horizon 2, again in yearly terms, although some information
of the forecasted year is used in the case of current year predictions.
Thus, I denote as:
em
t+h;f¿;jg = Xt+h ¡ ˆ Xm
t+h;f¿;jg (2)
the forecast error associated to a forecast ˆ Xm
t+h;f¿;jg elaborated with method m for year t + h,
with available information set f¿;jg. In case no intra-annual update is used ¿ = t and j = 0, while
in case intra-annual update is available ¿ = t + 1 and j 6= 0.
It is worth showing the results for the whole set of forecasts (i.e. j = 1;2;3;4 for all the years in
the forecast set) and for a disaggregation of them. On the one hand I select all forecasts performed
with information up to the ﬁrst and second quarter of a given year t for that year t (current year
forecasts) and year t + 1 (year ahead forecasts), i.e. I set j equal to 1 and 2. On the other hand,
I show the results for the set of forecasts with j = 3 and j = 4. The reason for presenting the
three sets of forecasts is practical and allows me to answer some questions relevant to the analyst:
is there a signal of deterioration/improvement already in the ﬁrst half of the year? is there a gain
in forecast accuracy when information for the second half of the year is used? by how much?
10The publishing date of the reports and the closing date for the included information in them, changed over the
period under study, including in diﬀerent editions diﬀerent quarterly information (see Kereman, 1999, for the years
1994-1998, and the publishing dates of EU Commission forecast reports for the years 1999 to 2003).
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The comparison is carried out along two dimensions: quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative
measures look at the size of the forecast errors (RMSE, Diebold and Mariano (1995) tests), while
a qualitative one looks at the sign of the direction of change. Both quantitative and qualitative
measures are complementary in a policy exercise like the one carried out here.
The ﬁrst, standard forecasting performance measure will be the ratio of the Root Mean Squared
Errors (RMSE) of the diﬀerent alternatives with respect to the annual random walk alternative,
that I take as the numeraire. In terms of the deﬁnition in equation (2), the RMSE for a set of
forecasts generated at quarter j of year t at horizon h with alternative m is:






















Notice that there are J ¡ j + 1 estimates available for each year, i.e. a total of N ´ (T ¡ t +
1) £ (J ¡ j + 1) forecast errors. Thus, the set of forecast errors fe
m; h
n gN
n=1 is an ordered vector
where the ﬁrst J ¡ j + 1 elements are estimates for the general government deﬁcit in year t + h,
the next subset of J ¡ j + 1 estimates are referred to year t + h + 1, and so on. Upon the basis of
(3) one can deﬁne the usual ratios of the RMSE of each method m to the random walk RMSE.
The ratio of RMSEs is a deterministic criterion and might be misleading in some cases because
the diﬀerences among alternatives may not be signiﬁcant from a statistical point of view. That is
why the second forecasting measure I employ is a statistic by Diebold and Mariano (1995), to test
for the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence in the accuracy of two competing forecasts. Consider the
time series of forecast errors fe
m;h
n gN
n=1. The idea of the test is to assess the expected loss associated
with each of the forecasts (or its negative, accuracy). Let the time-n loss associated with a forecast
generated with alternative m be an arbitrary function of the realization and prediction, g(e
m;h
n ).
The null hypothesis of equal forecast accuracy for two forecasts is E[g(e
m;h









n ) ¡ g(e
m0;h
n ) is the loss diﬀerential. Thus, the “equal
accuracy” null hypothesis is equivalent to the null hypothesis that the population mean of the




ˆ V (¯ dfm;m0g;h)
» N(0;1) (4)
where ¯ dfm;m0g;h = N¡1 PN
t=1 d
fm;m0g;h
n is the sample mean loss diﬀerential, and ˆ V (d
fm;m0g;h
n ) =
N¡1(ˆ °0 + 2
Ph¡1
k=1(1 ¡ k=h)ˆ °j), where ˆ °k is an estimate of the k-th order autocovariance of the
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, for k = 1;:::;h ¡ 1. ˆ V (d
fm;m0g;h
n ) is a consistent estimate of the asymptotic variance
V (d
fm;m0g;h
n ). For h = 1 the expression for ˆ V (d
fm;m0g;h
n ) collapses to the variance N¡1ˆ °0 with no
further corrections needed.
Regarding loss function speciﬁcation, I take the standard quadratic loss g(e) = e2, and the
absolute loss g(e) = jej. I will only show the results for the absolute loss case, for the results where
identical with both loss function speciﬁcations. I also tried the correction to the test suggested by
Harvey et al. (1997) for the case of small samples, and the results where again barely the same,
and are not shown either.
Finally, the third forecasting measure focus on whether the indicators are accurate in predicting
the direction of change of the target variable under consideration. This can be done by analysing
the percentage of correctly signed predictions.
4.4 Computation of quarterly forecasts for the indicator series
To generate General Government deﬁcit forecasts based on Error Correction regressions it is neces-
sary to have as an input forecasts for the exogenous indicator variables. I check diﬀerent standard,
univariate alternatives: (i) Unobserved Components Models; (ii) ARIMA models; (iii) a quarterly
random walk alternative.
Unobserved components models and ARIMA models are described in detail in Table 4. On the
one hand, ARIMA-based were obtained with the automatic modelling program TRAMO/SEATS
(see G´ omez and Maravall, 1996). On the other hand, Unobserved Components models were selected
according to a goodness of ﬁt criterion, and the AIC and SBC when necessary.
From the results in Table 4 some facts can be highlighted: (i) signiﬁcant estimates of the
trend-cycle components were obtained for all countries, indicating that it is possible to ﬁnd under-
lying smooth components useful for monitoring purposes; regarding modelling alternatives, both
approaches produced quite similar estimates of the underlying structural components, in particular
the trend-cycle ones; (ii) there was no signal of remaining autocorrelation in the residuals; (iii)
for Italy, Ireland, Austria, Finland, and to a lesser extent France, signals of non-modelled ARCH
structure in the residuals is found: this is related in some of the cases with outliers that go into
the residual component, and in other cases (in particular Italy) to higher residual variance in the
last part of the sample, as compared to the beginning of the sample.
Following the forecasting scheme described above, I performed a predictive ability exercise.
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but are almost non distinguishable among themselves in terms of RMSE ratio and Diebold-Mariano
test. In any case, even if the diﬀerences were minor, I selected as an input to the annual regressions
the quarterly method that produced the best quarterly-based annual forecasts in terms of RMSE
and Diebold-Mariano statistics: this led to selecting the Unobserved Components alternative for
Belgium and Italy, the ARIMA model for Germany, Spain, France, The Nehterlands, Ireland and
Austria, and the quarterly random walk for Finland.
4.5 Discussion of the results
In table 5 I present the ratios of RMSEs for all countries. The reading of the ratios is the standard
one. A ratio of 1 indicates that the model forecasts are as good as the random walk (no-change)
forecasts, while a ratio below 1 signals that the alternatives are better, and above 1 that they are
worse.
Several salient features are worth mentioning: (i) all methods with intra-annual update outper-
form the annual random walk; (ii) there seems to be an eﬃcient use of the quarterly information
as the case of fj = 3;J = 4g always present a better performance than the case fj = 1;J = 2g;
nevertheless, with information up to the second quarter the forecasts for the whole year tend to
present a reasonable accuracy record; (iii) Indicator-based forecasts present a performance which
is quite close to the EU Commission one, and even in the cases of Germany, France, The Nether-
lands and Ireland outperform it; (v) current year forecasts tend to be more accurate than year
ahead forecasts, as would be expected, but a reasonable performance in year ahead forecasts is
detected; it is worth mentioning that predictive ability of indicator-based alternatives is closer to
EU Commission in current year than in year ahead forecasts.
Finally, according to the RMSE ratios, the combination alternative is the one with smaller
current year errors in six out of nine considered countries, and in the three others its performance is
quite close to the best alternative (either the EU Commission or the indicator-based one). Regarding
year ahead forecasts the advantages of combination are less perceptible, but for three cases.
The gains of the combination alternative are more perceptible from Table 6, where I show the
Diebold-Mariano test for the null hypothesis of equal forecast accuracy of two alternative methods,
using the absolute value loss function. Each cell contains the value of the Diebold-Mariano statistic,
where the loss diﬀerentials input to the test convey the form g(em)¡g(em0
), with m being labelled
in the horizontal axis (m = “Comb” and m = “Regres”) and m0 in the vertical one (m = “Regres”
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and m = “EU Com”).Table 4: Univariate models for the quarterly indicators: Unobserved components models and
ARIMA models. For details see footnote.
Unobserved components model ARIMA model
Parameters Diagnosis on ² (yt: indicator variable)
Belgium p´ = ¡1:381(0:157) LM(1)(pval)=0.571 ∆∆4 yt = (1 + µB)(1 + ΘB4) ²A
t
1970-2003 p! = ¡1:204(0:109) LMARCH(1)(pval)=0.141 ˆ µ = ¡0:959(0:035) ˆ Θ = 0:061(0:096)
p² = ¡7:145(3:6 £ 105) LMARCH(2)(pval)=0.206 ¾2
²A = 10¡0:180(0:053)
Germany p´ = 0:619(0:160) LM(1)(pval)=0.218 (1 + ÁB)∆4 yt = ²A
t
1979-2003 p! = 0:176(0:154) LMARCH(1)(pval)=0.191 ˆ Á = ¡0:249(0:101)
p² = 0:455(0:490) LMARCH(2)(pval)=0.343 ¾2
²A = 101:501(0:062)
Spain p´ = ¡0:825(0:312) LM(1)(pval)=0.375 (1 + ΦB4)( yt + ¹) = ²A
t
1984-2003 p! = ¡0:842(0:226) LMARCH(1)(pval)=0.236 ˆ Φ = ¡0:575(0:104) ˆ ¹ = ¡2:341(0:490)
p² = 0:434(0:120) LMARCH(2)(pval)=0.299 ¾2
²A = 100:757(0:070)
France p´ = ¡0:175(0:187) LM(1)(pval)= 0.408 (1 + ÁB)∆4 yt = ²A
t
1970-2003 p! = 0:187(0:112) LMARCH(1)(pval)= 0.028 ˆ Á = 0:251(0:085)
p² = 0:330(0:337) LMARCH(2)(pval)= 0.024 ¾2
²A = 101:270(0:053)
Italy p´ = 0:158(0:259) LM(1)(pval)= 1.000 ∆4 yt = (1 + ΘB4) ²A
t
1970-2003 p! = ¡6:77(1:0 £ 105) LMARCH(1)(pval)= 0.046 ˆ Θ = ¡0:616(0:071)
p² = 1:747(0:063) LMARCH(2)(pval)= 0.000 ¾2
²A = 101:877(0:053)
½1 = ¡0:201(0:107);½2 = ¡0:132(0:104);½3 = ¡0:228(0:000);
The p´ = ¡0:911(0:208) LM(1)(pval)= 0.204 (1 + ÁB)∆4 yt = (1 + ΘB4) ²A
t
Netherlands p! = ¡1:273(0:152) LMARCH(1)(pval)= 0.291 ˆ Á = ¡0:249(0:085) ˆ Θ = ¡0:385(0:085)
1970-2003 p² = ¡0:238(0:048) LMARCH(2)(pval)= 0.318 ¾2
²A = 100:285(0:053)
½1 = 0:337(0:166);½2 = ¡0:358(0:169);
Ireland p´ = ¡1:941(0:196) LM(1)(pval)= 0.770 ∆4 yt = (1 + ΘB4) ²A
t
1970-2003 p! = ¡1:943(0:130) LMARCH(1)(pval)= 0.273 ˆ Θ = ¡0:211(0:092)
p² = ¡1:461(0:244) LMARCH(2)(pval)= 0.000 ¾2
²A = 10¡0:723(0:053)
p¯ = ¡10:624(0:196)
Austria p´ = ¡1:822(0:222) LM(1)(pval)= 0.132 ∆4 yt = (1 + µ1B + µ2B2)(1 + ΘB4) ²A
t
1980-2003 p! = ¡1:939(0:137) LMARCH(1)(pval)= 0.009 ˆ µ1 = ¡0:125(0:080) ˆ µ2 = 0:351(0:086)
p² = ¡1:146(0:154) LMARCH(2)(pval)= 0.000 ˆ Θ = ¡0:138(0:088)
p¯ = ¡5:664(3:041) ¾2
²A = 10¡0:584(0:053)
Finland p´ = ¡0:977(0:199) LM(1)(pval)= 0.272 ∆4 yt = (1 + µ1B + µ2B2)(1 + ΘB4) ²A
t
1982-2003 p! = ¡2:436(0:334) LMARCH(1)(pval)= 0.077 ˆ µ = ¡0:612(0:089) ˆ Θ = ¡0:690(0:090)
p² = ¡0:516(0:126) LMARCH(2)(pval)= 0.008 ¾2
²A = 10¡0:143(0:067)
Notes: (i) Figures in parenthesis are standard errors of the estimates.
(ii) Unobserved components models for a given indicator variable yt are of the form:
yt = ¹t + St + Át;
¹t = ¹t¡1 + ¯t + ´t; ´t » iid N(0;¾2
´); ¾2
´ = 10p´









j=1 St;j; St+1;j = cos(¸j)St;j + sin(¸j)S¤
t;j + !t;j; S¤
t+1;j = ¡sin(¸j)St;j + cos(¸j)S¤
t;j + !¤
t;j;¸k = 2¼k=s;
k = 1;2;:::;Rs;Rs = s=2 for s even and (s ¡ 1)=2 if s is odd: !¤
t;j;!t;j » iid N(0;¾2
!); ¾2
! = 10p!
Át = ½1Át¡1 + ½2Át¡2 + ½3Át¡3 + ²t; ²t » iid N(0;¾2
²); ¾2
² = 10p²
(iii) All parameters were estimated by Exact Maximum Likelihood with the MATLAB toolbox SSPACE of Pedregal (2004).
(iv) LM(k) test: test for the null hypothesis of no serial correlation up to order k in ²t.
(v) LMARCH(k) test: test for the null hypothesis of no ARCH eﬀect up to order k in ²t.
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June 2005Table 5: Forecasting performance statistics I. Ratio of Root Mean Squared Errors (RMSE) of
forecast alternatives to annual random walk RMSE. Alternatives: Indicator-based regression (“Re-
gression”), European Commission (“EU Com”) and forecast combination (“Combination”), for
years t to T (1994 to 2003), and quarters j to J.
Current year: ratio RMSEm;1=RMSERW;1 Year ahead: ratio RMSEm;2=RMSERW;2
j = 1;J = 4 j = 1;J = 2 j = 3;J = 4 j = 1;J = 4 j = 1;J = 2 j = 3;J = 4
Belgium Regression 0.547 0.589 0.506 0.346 0.410 0.282
EU Com 0.333 0.445 0.222 0.254 0.274 0.233
Combination 0.345 0.454 0.237 0.264 0.299 0.229
Germany Regression 0.546 0.729 0.364 0.807 0.944 0.670
EU Com 0.838 1.119 0.557 1.109 1.293 0.925
Combination 0.548 0.797 0.299 0.894 1.044 0.743
Spain Regression 0.398 0.492 0.304 0.477 0.676 0.279
EU Com 0.228 0.217 0.239 0.103 0.117 0.090
Combination 0.181 0.173 0.189 0.166 0.220 0.112
France Regression 0.405 0.463 0.348 0.285 0.339 0.230
EU Com 0.466 0.646 0.286 0.457 0.522 0.392
Combination 0.351 0.481 0.220 0.358 0.418 0.298
Italy Regression 0.359 0.484 0.234 0.292 0.283 0.301
EU Com 0.247 0.299 0.196 0.290 0.333 0.246
Combination 0.217 0.271 0.163 0.257 0.292 0.222
The Regression 0.715 1.010 0.421 0.510 0.570 0.449
Netherlands EU Com 0.790 0.951 0.629 0.663 0.735 0.591
Combination 0.690 0.898 0.481 0.585 0.655 0.515
Ireland Regression 0.585 0.704 0.466 0.499 0.527 0.472
EU Com 0.946 1.199 0.693 0.887 0.976 0.798
Combination 0.753 0.958 0.548 0.695 0.758 0.633
Austria Regression 0.454 0.524 0.383 0.513 0.657 0.369
EU Com 0.355 0.401 0.309 0.244 0.265 0.222
Combination 0.321 0.381 0.261 0.286 0.337 0.236
Finland Regression 0.688 0.700 0.677 0.450 0.630 0.269
EU Com 0.309 0.326 0.292 0.292 0.336 0.249
Combination 0.288 0.300 0.276 0.269 0.336 0.202
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June 2005Overall, for all countries, and horizons, the forecast combination is the alternative with less
associated loss: either the loss is lower in statistical terms, or the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant from
an statistical point of view.
In addition, the results of the test conﬁrm the basic insights already mentioned before. In
statistical terms, some diﬀerences between EU Commission forecasts and those from the indicator-
based alternative do exist, but are not quite ample. For example, for j = 1 and J = 4 and current
year forecasts, EU Commission forecasts dominate for Austria and Finland, while indicator-based
do so in the cases of Germany and Ireland, and the rest of the cases are not diﬀerent in statistical
terms (at 95% and 99% signiﬁcance levels). On other grounds, the losses associated to forecasts
using information of the second half of the year are quite similar across methods, being the basic
diﬀerences in the projections made with information of the ﬁrst half of the year.
Finally, in Table 7 I present the percentage of correctly predicted changes of the General Gov-
ernment deﬁcit. This table displays information quite relevant for the real-time analyst, and not
only a forecast accuracy record as it was the case with the two previously shown measures. The
main messages are again repeated as regards: (i) the comparative behaviour of indicator-based
forecasts and EU Commission ones; (ii) current year forecasts are quite informative, and also year
ahead but with a signiﬁcant minor record of correctly predicted changes; (iii) improved accuracy
in the case j = 3;J = 4 versus j = 1;J = 2, but with an important amount of changes already
captured in the ﬁrst half of the year; (iv) the combination approach appears as a useful alternative
in many cases.
In the case of the indicator-based alternative, the percentage of correctly predicted changes for
current year is above 75% for all countries, but for the case of The Netherlands where is close to
65%, when I take all the quarters, and quite more if I focus on the j = 3;J = 4 case. As regards
year ahead forecasts, the percentages are lower by 20 percentage points, but still range above 40-
50% in most cases, specially when forecasts are generated in the third and fourth quarters of the
previous year. Notice that if instead of computing the exact number of correctly predicted changes,
we were to compute this very number § a small range (say 0.2 points) the percentage of year ahead
forecasts would have increased substantially.
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June 2005Table 7: Percentage of correctly predicted changes in the General Government deﬁcit in
ESA79/ESA95 with forecasts generated with the alternatives: Indicator-based regression (“Re-
gression”), European Commission (“EU Com”) and forecast combination (“Combination”), for
years t to T (1994 to 2003), and quarters j to J.
Current year Year ahead
j = 1;J = 4 j = 1;J = 2 j = 3;J = 4 j = 1;J = 4 j = 1;J = 2 j = 3;J = 4
Belgium Regression 75 % 70 % 80 % 40 % 25 % 55 %
EU Com 70 % 65 % 75 % 45 % 40 % 50 %
Combination 75 % 70 % 80 % 38 % 30 % 45 %
Germany Regression 83 % 75 % 90 % 43 % 40 % 45 %
EU Com 73 % 60 % 85 % 50 % 50 % 50 %
Combination 83 % 70 % 95 % 33 % 30 % 35 %
Spain Regression 83 % 80 % 85 % 83 % 85 % 80 %
EU Com 83 % 80 % 85 % 88 % 90 % 85 %
Combination 85 % 85 % 85 % 83 % 85 % 80 %
France Regression 93 % 90 % 95 % 65 % 65 % 65 %
EU Com 90 % 85 % 95 % 65 % 60 % 70 %
Combination 88 % 80 % 95 % 53 % 50 % 55 %
Italy Regression 78 % 80 % 75 % 63 % 65 % 60 %
EU Com 65 % 65 % 65 % 70 % 70 % 70 %
Combination 65 % 70 % 60 % 70 % 70 % 70 %
The Regression 63 % 45 % 80 % 35 % 30 % 40 %
Netherlands EU Com 45 % 35 % 55 % 30 % 30 % 30 %
Combination 58 % 40 % 75 % 30 % 30 % 30 %
Ireland Regression 70 % 70 % 70 % 38 % 35 % 40 %
EU Com 65 % 55 % 75 % 43 % 40 % 45 %
Combination 68 % 60 % 75 % 38 % 35 % 40 %
Austria Regression 78 % 70 % 85 % 58 % 45 % 70 %
EU Com 90 % 85 % 95 % 65 % 60 % 70 %
Combination 90 % 85 % 95 % 63 % 55 % 70 %
Finland Regression 80 % 80 % 80 % 53 % 45 % 60 %
EU Com 100 % 100 % 100 % 85 % 80 % 90 %
Combination 95 % 90 % 100 % 83 % 80 % 85 %
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An immediate question arises: can the results obtained for individual countries’ indicators be
extrapolated to obtain an aggregate measure of the euro area ﬁscal stance? Given the current
policy framework in which there is a single monetary authority preoccupied by EMU aggregates
such as inﬂation or GDP, having an aggregate indication of the evolution of ﬁscal policy might be
useful.
The indicators for the analised countries showed a reasonable degree of information for moni-
toring and forecasting purposes for the annual general government deﬁcit. This was the case even
with the apparent erratic proﬁles witnessed in the indicator series a priori, evident ex-post in the
very high proportion of the variance allocated to the irregular components, that can be interpreted
as country-speciﬁc shocks (institutional peculiarities, policy events, etc). Intuitively, aggregation
might wash out country-speciﬁc events such as structural breaks or policy decisions. In addition,
the seasonal patterns at the country level appeared to be very strong. For Net Lending/Borrowing
series, one would not expect common patterns across countries in the seasonal components as the
main cause of these patterns is mainly due to the diﬀerent dating of revenue collection and timing
of payments, i.e. to diﬀerent legislations across countries.
In fact, even being all series in billion of euro, direct aggregation of the indicators would not
be correct given that, as already mentioned in the data section, the deﬁnitions are not fully ho-
mogenous. That is why I propose to base the aggregation of intra-annual indicators on the trend
components (obtained from a standard Unobserved Components decompositions or an ARIMA
structural model). By removing the irregular and seasonal components, one might guess that reg-
ular institutional patterns (for example, timing of collection of direct taxes) and the irregular ones
(for example, the changing calendar for debt redemption payments) would be somewhat removed,
resulting in a more homogenous measure of deﬁcit across countries.
Thus, I proceed to the aggregation of the trend components (i.e. seasonally adjusted series
minus the irregular). Using as weights for each country’s deﬁcit the country GDP weight on EMU
GDP, I aggregate the obtained estimates for the General Government deﬁcit as a percentage of
GDP based on individual indicators’ trends11. Then, I compare the forecast performance of this
measure with an EMU aggregate which is simply the sum of ESA General Government deﬁcits in
11A principal components analysis on the set of nine country trends detected two components with eigenvalues
with an absolute value larger than one. Aggregation of the two dominant components produced similar results to the
direct aggregation of trends.
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June 2005Table 8: EMU Indicator: in-sample and out-sample tests of predictive performance.
PANEL A: Error Correction Models: General Government Net Borrowing/Net Lending vs Indicator. Estimated equation:
∆ GGt






















Indicator 1.286 0.211 0.931 Impulse 1990 PT test (pval) = 0.00014
1980-2003 (0.110) (0.074) (0.056) F test (pval) = 0.00000
R2=0.91; ¾2
u=0.07; LM(1)(pval)=0.272; White Test(pval)=0.087
PANEL B: Forecast performance measures: percentage of correctly predicted changes, RMSE ratio and Diebold-Mariano.
Current year Year ahead
j = 1;J = 4 j = 1;J = 2 j = 3;J = 4 j = 1;J = 4 j = 1;J = 2 j = 3;J = 4
Method: GG estimates based on indicator-based regressions
RMSE=RMSERW 0.294 0.428 0.160 0.601 0.700 0.501
Diebold-Mariano (vs EU Com) -1.676 -1.340 -1.016 1.096 0.908 0.641
% predicted changes 95 % 100 % 90 % 28 % 20 % 35 %
Method: EU Commission provided estimates for GG
RMSE=RMSERW 0.430 0.575 0.285 0.448 0.514 0.381
Diebold-Mariano (vs Comb) 3.330 2.262 2.622 -0.181 -0.394 0.205
% predicted changes 68 % 55 % 80 % 48 % 50 % 45 %
Method: combination
RMSE=RMSERW 0.291 0.409 0.173 0.429 0.504 0.354
Diebold-Mariano (vs Reg) 0.696 0.736 0.185 -1.434 -1.115 -0.927
% predicted changes 83 % 75 % 90 % 43% 40 % 45 %
billions of euro as a percentage of EMU GDP.
The results are presented in Table 8, and conﬁrm the strong predictive ability of the trend-based
EMU indicator on the aggregate EMU deﬁcit in ESA terms. In the Table I display two panels,
comprising all the measures applied to individual country indicators throughout the paper.
Firstly, Panel A demonstrate the existence of cointegration between the indicator and the ESA
General Government aggregate, as the estimated long-term relationship and error correction term
turned out to be signiﬁcant. Around 20% of the disequilibrium is corrected in a year, while the
reaction of current year changes in the General Government deﬁcit to indicator changes is above
one, being estimated in 1.3 for the whole sample. The coeﬃcient of determination is quite high
(91%) and the residual variance is only 7%. Finally, the results of the PT and F tests stress the
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Secondly, Panel B shows out-sample predictive ability measures for indicator-based regressions,
EU Commission and the combination alternative. Some ﬁndings can be highlighted: (i) current
year forecasts resulted to be quite accurate, according to the low RMSE ratios and the high percent
of correctly predicted changes, specially for indicator-based regressions; (ii) on the contrary, year
ahead forecasts suggest a poor record in terms of correctly anticipated changes for all alternatives,
although the RMSE ratios are well below one, thus outperforming the random walk forecasts; (iii)
in terms of the results of the Diebold and Mariano test, both indicator-based and combination
alternatives dominate EU Commission current year forecasts, while are not statistically diﬀerent
among themselves.
Finally, in ﬁgure 4 I present an illustration that exempliﬁes the real-time usefulness of the
aggregate indicator, focusing on the ﬁscal loosening episode that started in 2001 for the main EMU
countries. In all panels of the ﬁgure I show General Government deﬁcit actual values (the thick
solid line) together with the forecasts from the indicator-based and the EU Commission alternatives
that would have been available to an analyst at the end of the ﬁrst and fourth quarters of 2001,
2002 and 2003 respectively.
The direct comparison of left and right panels is quite enlightening. The ﬁrst left and right
panels are the most informative ones, as they show the detection of the change in trend that occurred
in 2001, after six years of continued ﬁscal consolidation: in this case, the indicator-based alternative
would have signalled the deterioration already in the ﬁrst quarter of 2001, and the fourth quarter
information would have already forecast a deﬁcit ratio below 2%. These two messages contrast with
the information an analyst would have inferred by looking at the right panel. The same story is
repeated in the second row of panels, while the need for monthly/quarterly information is also clear
even in the third panel as regards EU Commission forecasts available by the end of March 2002.
The same exercise performed at the individual country level led to the same type of conclusions.
6 Conclusions
Annual ﬁscal forecasts are usually produced by annual models that combine estimated relationships
linking ﬁscal to macroeconomic variables, and judgement based on ﬁscal expertise. The main claim
of this paper is that the existing infra-annual ﬁscal information should be somewhat included by
the relevant agencies in the preparation of their annual forecasts and its intra-annual updates,
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June 2005Figure 4: Net lending for EMU: anticipation of the ﬁscal loosening that started in 2001. Actual
ﬁgures (thick solid line), indicator-based forecasts (left panels), and EU Commission forecasts (right
panels).
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June 2005either formally, through some kind of combination econometric method, or as another piece to be
taken, explicitly, in the judgemental analysis. As a by-product, another claim of the paper is that
monthly/quarterly available ﬁscal data could be included in macroeconomic studies, given its close
adherence to general government dynamics.
In this paper I show that the analyzed infra-annual indicators contain valuable information to
monitor and forecast General Government Net Lending / Net Borrowing developments. I provide
quantitative and qualitative results that strongly support this ﬁnding. Purposely, I focus on deﬁcit
indicators for the main EMU countries (Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, The Netherlands,
Ireland, Austria, Finland), that could be used as early-warning-signal tools for the deﬁcit of the
General Government sector as a whole. An immediate extension of this paper would be extending
the analysis to other general government sectors, and to a disaggregation of revenue and expenditure
categories. Given the results in this paper, both avenues look promising.
An additional contribution of this paper is the extension of individual countries’ results to a
simple EMU aggregate, where again I show the usefulness of considering explicitly intra-annual
information in the monitoring and forecasting process. Given the current monetary setup in the
euro area, the availability of real-time measures of the aggregate ﬁscal stance should be a valuable
input into the policy decision process.
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